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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

CLD-232

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-1543
___________
OMAR S. FOLK,
Appellant
v.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, Employees and Medical Staff; PA-C Samuel GOSA;
ELIZABETH SANTOS/STAHL, Clinical Director; DR. ROBERT E. PUCELL; JOHN
T. BURN; BRIAN BUSCHMAN; D. PARKER; M. MAGYAR; R. PARKYN;
C. SMITH; JENNIFER HOLTZ-APPLE; DAVID J. BALL; PA-C ZALNO; CO.
GENTZYEL; R&D FAUSEY; M. WASHINGTON; L. HUNTER; J. POTOPE;
T. GREELY; T. ANDRESS; T. CULLEN; J. MARIS; A. RODERMEL; A. DEWALT;
C. CRAIG; NICK MAIZE; C. ERICKSON; E. STAHL; J. WALKER; C. CAIN;
J. FREYNIK; D. NICOLLETTE; T. THOMAS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civil No. 3:18-cv-02252)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 29, 2021
Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 11, 2021)

_________
OPINION *
_________
PER CURIAM
Omar Sierre Folk appeals from orders of the District Court dismissing his claims
and ruling on several motions. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
I.
In 2018, Folk initiated an action in the District Court, bringing civil rights claims
relating to his medical care in prison. Folk subsequently amended his complaint, and
several defendants moved to dismiss it. The District Court granted their motion without
prejudice and with leave to further amend.
In doing so, the District Court directed Folk to comply with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8 and 20 when filing a second amended complaint. The District Court
explained that Folk’s 14-page amended complaint primarily set out summaries of isolated
and unrelated events, spanning five years, and named 16 defendants. It instructed him
about the requirements of Rules 8 and 20, noting that he should identify his related claims
against each defendant individually, along with the facts supporting those claims. The

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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District Court explained that if Folk wished to bring claims about separate, unrelated
incidents, he should file separate complaints initiating additional actions to address those
unrelated incidents. The District Court also warned that this would be Folk’s final
opportunity to amend his complaint to comply with Rules 8 and 20.
Rather than clarify his claims, Folk responded by filing a 247-page second
amended complaint against 51 defendants. This document is a largely handwritten
account of Folk’s interactions with various prison staff and medical providers between
2013 and 2020. In portions of the complaint, Folk alleged that Dr. David J. Ball, a
private physician, failed to adequately treat knee and thigh injuries from 2013 to 2018.
Folk stated that Dr. Ball ordered several MRIs and x-rays of Folk’s leg and ordered nerve
testing and a new knee brace for him. Dr. Ball also recommended injections to treat
Folk’s pain, but Folk declined them. Folk claimed that Dr. Ball refused to perform
surgery on his ruptured quadricep because he feared that Folk may have permanent nerve
damage and recommended physical therapy and exercise as an alternative treatment.
Dr. Ball filed a motion to dismiss, as did a group of defendants employed by the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”); the remaining defendants Folk named in his second amended
complaint had not yet been served. In the meantime, Folk moved for: (1) reconsideration
of an earlier order denying his request for intervention from the District Court regarding
his legal mail; (2) an entry of default against certain defendants; and (3) appointment of
counsel. The District Court ultimately deemed Folk’s first motion to be withdrawn for
3

failure to comply with a local rule and denied the others. The District Court subsequently
granted Dr. Ball’s motion to dismiss Folk’s claims against him pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It also dismissed the remainder of Folk’s complaint pursuant
to Rules 8 and 20. The District Court did so by granting the BOP defendants’ motion and
dismissing, sua sponte, Folk’s remaining claims against several dozen unserved
defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Folk timely appealed, specifying that he sought to appeal the dismissal of his
claims and the District Court’s rulings on his other motions. On appeal, he has filed a
motion to vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand the case.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. While we
exercise plenary review over a district court’s dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6),
see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009), we review a dismissal
for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 8 for an abuse of discretion, see In re
Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996). Dismissal for failure to state
a claim is appropriate “if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true
and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that [the]
plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d
77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). We construe Folk’s pro se pleadings liberally, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and may summarily affirm a district court’s decision
4

“on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question,
see Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
III.
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Folk’s claims. For his claims
against Dr. Ball, the District Court correctly concluded that Folk failed to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). Although it was not entirely clear, it appeared that Folk sought to
bring claims of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and professional negligence
under state law. “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).
Establishing a claim requires proving both an objective component — “a serious medical
need” — and a subjective component — “acts or omissions by prison officials that
indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility,
318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
Folk alleged that Dr. Ball conducted testing, ordered an assistive device, and
offered injections for pain that Folk declined. He also claimed that Dr. Ball would not
perform surgery on an injury because he feared that Folk would have permanent nerve
damage, offering alternative treatment in the form of physical therapy and exercise.
These allegations show that Folk merely disagreed with the course of treatment
recommended by Dr. Ball. However, mere disagreement with medical treatment does not
5

constitute deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. See Monmouth Cnty.
Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d. Cir. 1987); see also U.S. ex rel.
Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (“Where a
prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the
treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and
to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”) (citation omitted).
Further, the District Court properly dismissed Folk’s claim of professional
negligence against Dr. Ball. Folk did not file a certificate of merit (“COM”) or claim that
a COM was unnecessary, as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3,
despite receiving ample notice about the requirement in Dr. Ball’s motion to dismiss. See
Schmigel v. Uchal, 800 F.3d 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Pennsylvania’s notice
requirement, like the COM requirement itself, is substantive state law under [Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)].”); Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659
F.3d 258, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.6-7. Accordingly, Folk’s
claims against Dr. Ball were properly dismissed.
We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the remainder of Folk’s claims under Rule 8. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2). Each averment must be “simple, concise,
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and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “Taken together,” Rules 8(a) and 8(d)(1)
“underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules.”
Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 702 (citation omitted). A statement must be plain “to give the
adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare
for trial,” and must be short to avoid placing “an unjustified burden on the court and the
part[ies] who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant material
from a mass of verbiage.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation
omitted).
Folk’s second amended complaint was anything but “simple, concise, and direct.”
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rather than clarifying his 14-page amended complaint,
Folk’s 247-page second amended complaint, which spans seven years of encounters with
dozens of people, is dense, very difficult to follow, and lacking any consistent structure.
It is so voluminous and unfocused that it is largely impossible to identify what about
Folk’s encounters with most prison and medical staff could support any claim for relief or
what those claims were for each of the 51 defendants.
As was the case here, “a district court acts within its discretion when it dismisses
an excessively prolix and overlong complaint,” especially after the litigant has been given
an opportunity “to better tailor [his] pleading.” See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d
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69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1611 (2020). 1 The District Court
“expressly warned [Folk] that failure to replead [his] claims in compliance with Rule 8
would result in the dismissal of those claims” and explained how to comply with that
rule. See Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 704. Where Folk responded by filing an extremely
lengthy document that was significantly harder to understand, dismissal of his complaint
under Rule 8 was appropriate. 2 See id. at 703 (affirming the dismissal of an
“unnecessarily complicated and verbose” 240-page counseled complaint that plaintiffs
had failed to sufficiently narrow through “two rounds of difficult motions”); see also
Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that it is not a
“district court’s job to stitch together cognizable claims for relief from [a] wholly
deficient pleading”). Under these circumstances, the District Court also did not err in

In light of this conclusion, we need not consider the District Court’s additional
conclusion that Folk’s second amended complaint violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, which is
not an independent basis to dismiss a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. We note,
however, that the District Court’s Rule 20 analysis further underscores the deficiencies of
Folk’s second amended complaint under Rule 8. The manner in which Folk included so
many claims against so many defendants makes it exceedingly difficult to determine
where one claim ends and another begins and which specific claims relate to which
specific defendants. In that regard, we note that the fact that Dr. Ball was able to identify
and respond to claims against him does not mean that the same was true for the other
defendants. Cf. Garrett, 938 F.3d at 96 n.29 (addressing the application of Rule 8 to
“specific defendants”).
2
For the same reasons, the District Court did not err in dismissing Folk’s claims against
the unserved defendants sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to comply
with Rule 8. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that a
district court may dismiss claims sua sponte for failure to comply with Rule 8 where a
“complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true
substance, if any, is well disguised”) (citation omitted).
8
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denying Folk further leave to amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
We further conclude that the District Court did not err in denying Folk’s other
motions. We discern no error in the District Court’s decision to deem Folk’s motion for
reconsideration of an earlier order regarding his legal mail to be withdrawn under M.D.
Pa. Local Rule 7.5 after he did not timely file a brief in support of the motion. See
United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2000). The District Court
also did not abuse its discretion in denying, without prejudice, Folk’s request for an entry
of default against defendants who had not yet been served. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a);
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). Finally, although it is
unfortunate that Folk appears unable to articulate the claims he may believe he has, we
have no basis to conclude that any such claims might be potentially valid and thus cannot
say that the District Court abused its discretion by denying Folk’s request for
appointment of counsel. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 3
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Folk’s motion to vacate and remand is denied.
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